Budget remains thin for defences at 50% of previous readiness (675 words)

Published: 1/4/2001

Recent reports indicate that the level of combat readiness of the air defence system around Moscow is steadily falling. The air defence network was first established in 1952 as the First Anti-Aircraft Defence Army, with peak strength of 11 fighter regiments and 56 anti-aircraft missile regiments, deployed around the city in two defence rings and four intercept rings. Today, however, the city's air defences are suffering from a steady decline in their effectiveness, due to budget problems and sweeping restructuring. The anti-aircraft units, extensively equipped with S-300s in the early 1980's, had been restructured six times, before finally being absorbed into the Air Force, thus giving the latter an estimated 2000 aircraft in addition to missile defences, of which 700 were Su-27s and MiG-31s. The Moscow Military District of the Air Force and Anti-aircraft Forces was formed in June of 1998. It incorporated the Anti-aircraft Forces with several Air Force fighter regiments. The merger led to the closure of 20 airfields and over 300 facilities, with only six of the 11 fighter regiments surviving (one equipped with Su-27s, two with MiG-29s and three with MiG-31s). There are further reports that two of the MiG-31 regiments are under review and may be disbanded. Operationally, the units are reported to be low on fuel for training and short of pilots, in common with much of the rest of the Russian Air Force. The missile units have withdrawn a number of S-300s from service, along with radar units. The latter withdrawals are leaving the radar system heavily overburdened in its monitoring of Russian air space, which identifies an average of 30 air space violations per month. The Moscow-based publication, Argumenty I Fakty-Moskva, reports that these shortages and structural changes have left the system operating at 50% of its capability, as it stood, before the restructuring of the defence forces. New equipment has been promised by the head of the Air Force, Anatoly Kornukov, with deliveries set to start in 2007 and continue through to 2010.He has said that some equipment will come sooner; with the first Protivnik and Konteiner radars due in 2003 and the new S-400 missile systems to be delivered later this year to bases close to Moscow. The need for expenditure on the sophisticated equipment required by the air defence forces is indicative of the dilemma facing the Russian Air Force and the Russian armed forces as a whole. The cost of developing equipment and then funding its purchase takes a large proportion of a thin defence budget, which, although growing, is dwarfed by the expenditure of the United States, on potential offensive capability. The debate within Russian military circles is, therefore, focussed on spending the funds that are available on the immediate needs of the armed forces locked in conflict in southern Russia - for helicopters and ground attack aircraft. The recent “resignation” of Colonel-General Sitnov (head of the Ministry of Defence Equipment Directorate), can be seen as an illustration of the increasingly bitter debate within the MoD and government, regarding the course of equipment development/acquisition. Given the latter's belief in the maintenance of a large military industrial complex, Sitnov's departure may signal that the camp supporting a more “pragmatic” approach - towards equipping the armed forces, and also reflecting the changed status of the Russian armed forces - may have won the day. The replacement of equipment in significant quantities appears to be unlikely, in the short term. Considerable resources are being employed in the upgrade of the existing fleet, with programmes underway for all the aircraft in the air defence fleet. A great deal is being made, by the producers, of the ability of these aircraft to offer 4th generation + capability, with new avionics and weapons systems. The funding for the upgrades appears to be piggy-backing on contracts for export customers, which, while presenting opportunities, also means that foreign customers will receive priority over domestic. The need to earn from the export of missile systems also suggests that non-Russian customers may receive equipment more speedily than the Russian Armed Forces.

Article ID: 2272