The 
  first flights of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) technology during the last few 
  months have revived the debate within Russia about the development of the fifth-generation 
  fighter programmes. According to reports, the issue of ongoing development of 
  the technologies for a fifth generation aircraft has been discussed at the Security 
  Council, largely responsible for making the commitments, in September and October 
  2000. 
For the industry the issue while by no means a new theme, has taken on increasing 
  importance. Primarily due to the belief among producers and export agencies 
  that a failure to continue with development of the technologies currently employed 
  in the two demonstrator aircraft, the Article 1.44 and the S-37, will severely 
  limit the ability of the Russian industry to compete internationally in the 
  medium term, removing Russia from a market in which it has been highly successful 
  globally.
The increasing desperation of the industry for the future has however, come 
  at a time when the industry's primary target market, the Russian Air Force, 
  has been delaying and reconsidering the nature of its requirement for a replacement 
  fighter. A stance that reflects, both the MoD's immediate and medium term funding 
  pressures and an operational mission far removed from a fifth generation fighter. 
  This lack of an immediate mission has left the government according to reports, 
  with the dilemma of not particularly wanting the fifth generation aircraft, 
  but eager to make sure that the skills and knowledge base required to build 
  such aircraft and other advanced aerospace programmes in the future stays intact. 
  This lack of an immediate need is also accompanied by the desire on the part 
  of the budget ministries to reduce defence expenditure, particularly funding 
  in this area, which has been sustained at a low level since the MFI was first 
  envisaged. Unofficially the original fifth generation MFI proposal has been 
  rejected as too expensive, in favour of the replacement with the lightweight 
  LFI. For the producers and export agencies this has resulted in the focus of 
  developments being the export markets, principally India and China, both having 
  been offered potential fighter versions of the two demonstrators. Some interest 
  was received, but little has resulted in the way of tangible commitment from 
  potential partners, although there remains much speculation of international 
  cooperation on a programme even the belief that the Europeans may have interest 
  in such a cooperation.
 For the industry the need for further development is viewed as pressing,illustrated 
  by a comment from a source within Rosaviacosmos (Russian Aerospace Agency), 
  "If we do not make a move now, the JSF might find itself the only export-cleared 
  new affordable fighter on the market and will have all of the market". Mikhail 
  Pogosyan of AVPK Sukhoi, has expressed a similar stance believing that if a 
  fifth-generation fighter program is not launched this year then Russia will 
  lose its position on the future fighter market. Rosaviacosmos is reported to 
  be proposing to the Russian government that it encourages the creation of an 
  industrial group that would undertake development and production of fifth-generation 
  fighters. The industrial group according to sources will be made up of "economically 
  healthy and technically capable enterprises with the ability to concentrate 
  their resources on a cost-effective development of the fighter aircraft and 
  its components". What this actually means in reality is unclear, but seems likely 
  that Sukhoi, given its current financial and technological strength, will lead 
  the proposed "fifth-generation fighter directorate" tasked with guiding this 
  industrial group. The ability of the agency to achieve such a structure is still 
  the subject of debate given that the Putin administration seems considerably 
  less committed to the agency and its leadership role than the previous administration. 
Recent changes in the administration of the industry through the merger of 
  the two leading export agencies and the establishment of a new management however, 
  suggest that the programme financed by a tax on revenues onexport arms sales, 
  of which Sukhoi's sales are the largest component, may find a more sympathetic 
  hearing from government. The new arrangements will have to resolve a fifth generation 
  development limbo land in which Sukhoi and MiG continue their respective programmes, 
  but with no great enthusiasm and Yakolev, the third fighter bureau increasingly 
  under funding pressure has no fifth generation involvement. Neither of the programmes 
  is particularly advanced in terms of testing with the S-37 prototype still lacking 
  a fifth generation engine. The rivalry between the two active participants has 
  also not led to cooperation with little sharing of data from the new technologies. 
The 
  programmes 
The Light Combat Aircraft (LFI) was originally discussed in 1998-1999 as a 
  competitor in the program to create a Multi-Functional Frontal Fighter (MFI) 
  initially outlined in the 1980's. Over time however, it has largely surpassed 
  the MFI, although itseems likely that the MFI will not be totally abandoned 
  in favour of an LFI programme developed from scratch in the current budgetary 
  environment. The LFI is therefore likely to incorporate technology from the 
  existing fifth generation demonstrator programmes. With reports suggesting that 
  the MiG LFI offering could be a scaled down MFI or in the case of Sukhoi an 
  S-37 powered by a single AL-41F. Provided that the MoD finds one or other an 
  attractive base both in cost and design for the aircraft's development, the 
  development of the existing demonstrators would seem to justified for the producers 
  at least, as those without any exposure seem unlikely to gain access to potential 
  contracts in the future.MiG's prospects as a programme leader however, seem 
  limited given the general acceptance of the Sukhoi's primacy, but potentially 
  the fifth generation may yet becoem the catalyst for the merger of the two entites 
  as suggested early in 1999.
 Mikoyan offering for the LFI is currently being designed and reportedly would 
  use the Article 1.44 to test its AL-41F engines and assess issues of the new 
  aircraft's aerodynamics and controllability. The problem for the development 
  may however be the funding and status of the Article 1.44 technology. To date, 
  instead of the 24-28 flights as "a first stage" of the MFI flight-test program, 
  the aircraft has made only two flights since February 2000. The slow progress 
  explained in part by the lack of funding and the low priority given to the MFI 
  by RSK MiG management. The RSK MiG Engineering Center (formerly the Mikoyan 
  design bureau) has largely focused their efforts on the fourth-generation + 
  aircraft the MiG-29SMT-2, MiG-29K and MiG-31BM. RSK MiG's commitment to those 
  "4+" generation military programmes and that of the Tupolev Tu-334 100-seater 
  airliner have undoubtedly reduced the priority of the fifth-generation fighter 
  designs, largely being funded by the bureaus themselves. 
Only Sukhoi appears to have the current capability and resources to have any 
  chance of producing a fifth-generation fighter at the level of the JSF. In contrast 
  to RSK MiG, Sukhoi has been far more successful in developing and selling its 
  "4+" generation combat aircraft - the Su-30MKI and Su-30MKK, with the commensurate 
  cash flow. Although the group's progress with the fifth-generation combat aircraft 
  programmes has also been slow given that Sukhoi has also focused on improving 
  existing aircraft, in this case the Su-27 Flanker, and gaining near term revenues 
  rather than aggressively testing the S-37 Berkut and developing Sukhoi's vision 
  of the LFI. Some sources within Russia are even arguing that the LFI may be 
  redundant for the export markets in the medium term. The arguement being that 
  the upgraded Su-27KUB, while not as technologically advanced as the Berkut, 
  with AL-41F engines and N014 radar, will represent a low cost export competitor 
  for Russia, even against the JSF and F-22 Raptor in their early downgraded export 
  versions . 
For those companies charged with the development of the fifth generation avionics 
  and radar. The foreign funding for the development of the Su-30MKK and Su-30MKI 
  programmes, has allowed Phazotron-NIIR of Moscow, RPKB of Ramenskoye and NIIP 
  of Zhukovsky - to launch the development of fifth-generation on-board equipment. 
  The primary element for any successful development of a fifth generation aircraft 
  is the fifth-generation engines. The Al-41F thoroughly tested on a MiG-25 test-bed 
  as early as 1987-88 and produced by the Moscow-based A.Lyulka-Saturn company 
  has little current competition and is unlikely to have any given that no potential 
  competitor is beyond the basic design stage. As with the assembly of the aircraft, 
  Rosaviacosmos and other state bodies are reported to be considering a plan to 
  create a new venture with engine producers to put the AL-41F and other fifth 
  generation engines into. This industrial group would undoubtedly include Rybinsk 
  Motors, MMPP Salyut and TsIAM (Central Institute for Aviation Engine-building).