Our military aviation correspondent reviews the activities of Russian airborne forces in Chechnya in the latest Chechen war

Published: 2/15/2000

The beginning The current war on North Caucasus began on 7th August 1999, with the invasion of a 1,500-strong group of armed Chechens, headed by Shamil Basayev (followers of Vakhaabit version of Muslim religion) into the territory of the autonomous republic of Dagestan: a part of the Russian Federation. Meeting no resistance, they occupied a number of villages in Tsumadisky and Botlikhsky regions. To prevent further Chechen penetration, the federal authorities ordered a speedy deployment of regular troops along the Dagestan-Chechen border. The troops came in fire contact with Basayev"s army on 8th August. The Russian Air Force (RusAF) and Army Aviation were involved in the hostilities from the very beginning. On 8th August, Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters flew several dozen combat missions from the Botlikh airdrome. They were supported by Su-24s and Su-25s from bases in South Russia, most notably Mozdok. The first losses occurred on 11th August, when Basayev sent an “expedition force" to the Botlikh airdrome, which destroyed two Mi-8s with Fagot anti-tank missiles at a distance of 3-4 km. The Russians responded by dropping vacuum bombs on Chechen positions and mining from the air a large stretch of the Dagestan-Chechen border in order to cut off Basayev"s force from the bases in Chechnya. By 12th August, Russian aviation had performed over 200 strike missions. The forces in Dagestan had built up and the daily rate settled down at some 100 sorties. The first combat airplane, an Su-25, was lost on 9th September, near Buinaksk. The following day, the RusAF launched bombing raids deep into Chechen territory on large military and industrial targets, such as military camps, power and heating stations, radars, communications centers, oil processing factories and bridges. As in the first Chechen campaign, the airport of Grozhny (“Severny") was attacked in the first place. The Chechens retaliated by bringing down on 11th September a Mi-8 flying a fire control mission in Dagestan. Satellites There are various theories as to why the Russians had waited for more than a month with raids on Chechnya. One of these is that, by early September, they simply had not had detailed trustworthy information on the location of Chechen military camps. The required data came from a photo reconnaissance satellite of the Yantar series: the spacecraft was hastily put in orbit shortly after hostilities in Dagestan began. The space component has been the weakest in the structure of Russian forces fighting against the Chechen separatists. Except for this single photo reconnaissance satellite, the federal forces can use only two other satellites intended for radio emission monitoring. (These proved useful in the first Chechen campaign when allocated coordinates of an operating mobile satellite phone. The data was passed over to a patrolling Su-24 whose bomb killed the President of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudaeyev). Aircraft In the new war on the North Caucasus the RusAF and Army Aviation use the same aircraft as in the first Chechen campaign. The strike aviation is 100% composed of Sukhoi aircraft, the Su-24 and Su-24M frontal bombers and Su-25 armored attack aircraft. In numerical terms, shares of Su-24 and Su-25 missions have been nearly equal, with some advantage to the Su-25. The Tu-22M3 “Eurostrategic" bombers (NATO codename Backfire) have not been used yet (though they still have a chance to participate in bombing raids on the separatists" bases in the maintains). The Su-17 fighter-bombers have been retired from service and so do not participate in this campaign. The Su-27 interceptors, which patrolled Chechen airspace in the first Chechen campaign, have also not been used. The only new participant is the Su-25T attack aircraft. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD), these aircraft destroyed a number of important pin-point targets at the early stage of the campaign. Unlike ordinary Su-25s, the Su-25T can effectively fly night missions, while its modern navigation and aiming systems allow precise strikes in all weathers. The Su-25Ts carry KAB-500KR TV-guided bombs, X-25ML (NATO designation AS-9 Karen) laser-guided missiles and, most notably, the state-of-the-art Vikhr (NATO designation AT-6?) laser-beam-riding missiles with a firing range of 15 km. In good weather the Su-25T"s Shkval electro-optical sight (with magnitude of 23) provides aiming for the Vikhr with a circular error of 0.6 m. Reportedly, the Su-25Ts made a number of successful attacks on well-defended pin-point targets, which were destroyed during the first run (and so eliminating the need for a second run, during which the likelihood of getting a hit considerably increases.) In particular, Su-25Ts destroyed an An-2 aircraft at Grozny airport (with an X-25ML missile), a cellular phone centre and relay stations in the Chechen capital. Standard Su-25s have been used primarily against targets along the front-line. Reportedly, in 1999, the RusAF had 250 Su-25s. This means that a good portion of flightworthy aircraft have had a check in Dagestan or Chechnya. In most instances, Su-25s carry 250- or 500-kg free-fall bombs and 58-mm S-8 unguided rockets. They usually attack from a low altitude, dropping bombs and firing with 30-mm shells from the twin-barrel built-in cannon. A standard load during a close fire support mission is six packs of 58-mm rockets and two additional fuel tanks on inner under-wing pylons. Sometimes higher caliber rockets are used, such as the S-13 (132 mm) and S-24 (240 mm). The Su-25's aiming systems allow strikes with laser-guided bombs and missiles in daylight conditions but, in most instances, the attack aircraft are limited to unguided weapons. Although the airplane"s rather simple avionics do not provide accurate aiming at night, there have been a number of cases when Su-25s committed night strikes with 250- and 500-kg free-fall bombs after their targets were illuminated with the help of light-emitting bombs dropped in the area beforehand and slowly descending on parachutes. When the armour protection of the Su-25 is not required or the weapons load of the 17-tonne aircraft is not enough, the RusAF sends a 40-tonne Su-24M swing-wing frontal bomber. The Su-24M, whose production began in 1979, has an impressive set of navigation and aiming systems. Its Tigr aiming complex includes two radar stations (the Orion forward-looking radar and the Relief radar for terrain following). The bomber can carry up to 8 tons of weapons, including KAB-500 and KAB-1500 guided bombs, X-25 (AS-9 Karen) and X-29 (AS-14 Kedge) missiles. The Su-24 is the most numerous type in RusAF inventory (365 such aircraft, plus 110 aircraft in other services). The Su-24s can continue to fly in bad weather when other types are grounded. The airplane"s avionics set was specially designed for "blind" missions. Su-24s fly at an altitude of 5 km and higher, so as to remain out of reach for shoulder-launched missiles. Frontal bombers now fly most of the mining missions: attempts to use Su-25s for mining in bad weather resulted in the inadvertent mining of Georgian territory (near the village of Zelo Omalo) on 9th August. Helicopters Gigantic Mi-26s are sometimes used for delivery of troops, armament and supplies. In Dagestan, when the federal forces had to attack fortified positions in the hills, the armoured Mi-24 fire support helicopters closely interacted with artillery. Normally, the artillery make the first strike; the helicopters appeared shortly after, while the guns continued to fire. The Mi-24s were often used to pinpoint and destroy targets using anti-tank missiles, as well as other targets which were difficult to destroy for the artillery. According to Colonel General Vitaly Pavlov, Commander of Army Aviation, the helicopters and artillery solve 70-90% of all fire tasks in Dagestan, with the helicopters" share being close to 50%. Pavlov asserted that helicopters are used more intensively than in the 1994-1996 war. Now, a temporary tactical aviation group of two to four Mi-24 and 1-2 Mi-8 aircraft is normally attached to every motorized infantry regiment on the front line. The largest problem so far has been the poor skills of ground controllers. To overcome it, an Mi-8 is often used as a flying control post helping Mi-24s find and attack a target. When the Russian troops advanced deep into Chechen territory, one-third of all Mi-24 missions in Chechnya were “free hunting". Now, with 80-90% of military targets having been destroyed, the share of free hunting is decreasing. More missions are now flown to support the 5000 servicemen that were deployed high in the mountains to close roads between Chechnya, Georgia and Osetiya. As a rule, an Mi-8 carries supplies, while an Mi-24 covers it on a typical supply mission to the mountains. Reportedly, the Army Aviation has so far lost three Mi-8s. None of the Mi-24s have been lost, although some aircraft returned home with 20-30 bullet holes. Among the problems encountered in this war is a lack of precise navigation equipment, which makes missions in the mountains very difficult for helicopter pilots. Only five Mi-8s of the whole helicopter fleet involved in the war have GPS (global positioning system) receivers: these five were earlier used in Angola. The other problem is a bad protection of communications lines. Rebels are said to be using western modern equipment for jamming Russian communication lines and even for misdirecting helicopters. Photo reconnaissance Photo reconnaissance missions are flown by the Su-24MR (the most numerous reconnaissance aircraft in the Russian inventory - in all, 160 such aircraft) and, sometimes, by the MiG-25RB and An-30. The federal forces also use unmanned air vehicles (UAVs). Reportedly, one Stroi-P complex, incorporating three launchers of Yakovlev Pchela-1T propeller-driven UAVs, was deployed to the combat arena on 4th October. Use of these UAVs has been limited, due to the bad weather and their inadequate technical capabilities (the Pchela-1T carries only day-light TV cameras). The Stroi-P had a limited use in Chechnya in 1995 before being officially accepted in service in 1997. Russian armed forces are believed to have only three Stroi-P complexes, each equipped with ten UAVs. The 130-kg Pchela-1T can withstand only ten landings. Reportedly, in 1995 five UAVs made 10 flights. Two were lost to ground fire. A night version of the UAV continues to undergo state acceptance trials and is not available for combat use in Chechnya. Meantime, when hostilities in Dagestan began, the MoD placed an order for 40 new UAVs for delivery in late 1999 - early 2000. Reportedly, all these UAVs are intended for troops in Chechnya. The Russian army also has a number of Tupolev jet-powered UAVs, but so far there has been no confirmation that these were used in Chechnya. Tactical missiles According to the MoD, on 6th November, the Russian forces in Chechnya launched eight Tochka tactical missiles on targets in the southern outskirts of Grozny, where a group of 2,000 rebels had been detected. The 9K79 Tochka is a 2-tonne missile with a 480-kg warhead, a maximum firing range of 120 km and a circular error at that range of 170 m. It seems that the decision to use tactical missiles was caused by two factors. The first was to check the modified missile (Tochka-U) in real combat. The second was the very bad weather that day, preventing the use of manned aircraft. Smart weapons For propaganda purposes, high ranking MoD and other government officials try to draw parallels between the Chechen campaign and NATO strikes on Iraq and Yugoslavia. “The lessons were learnt", they say, adding that, in Chechnya, smart weapons are used more extensively than ever in an effort to minimize damage to civilian objects and prevent losses among the population. Although the use of highly accurate weapons does have its place, their share remains low, being some 2-4% of all munitions used. The Russian generals agree with this estimate, reiterating that only 8% of all strikes during the Desert Storm campaign were made using smart weapons. They conclude “the Russians do not lag much behind the West in this respect". What does make the new campaign differ from the previous war in Chechnya is the fact that the share of artillery and aviation in strikes against the rebels is notably higher at the expense of tanks and infantry. As a rule, troops move forward after a heavy gun firing and bombing at identified or suspected points of resistance. The smart weapons used by the Russian forces in Chechnya can be divided into three categories. The first category is represented by anti-tank missiles, “corrected" 152-mm howitzer shells and 210-mm mines, all using laser illumination of the target. The second category comprises Mi-24 helicopters, armed with Shturm missiles. Although called “anti-tank", these missiles are often used against non-armored targets. The third level is laser and TV guided bombs and missiles carried by Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft. The Su-24 and Su-25 use the same types of weapons as they did during the previous war, including the KAB-500 and KAB-1500 laser- and TV- guided bombs, X-25 and X-29 air-to-surface missiles. Although not new, these weapons provide a high accuracy of strikes, with experienced pilots being often able to score a direct hit at a chosen wheel in the tank chassis. There are many reports that most of the smart weapons used in Chechnya had their assigned lifetimes expired or nearly expired. The explanation for this is simple. The MoD will use up stockpiles of aging munitions first, so as to keep more recent examples for future use. This approach is applied to almost every kind of munitions, from 7.62-mm shells to KAB-1500 bombs. Vacuum bombs Vacuum bombs were used in Dagestan against fortified positions in the hills and mountains. (Russian TV showed a recording of such a bomb exploding in Dagestan). There are unconfirmed reports that vacuum bombs were used against bunkers in Grozny and near the city. Officially, the first use of vacuum bombs, 1500 kg calibre, within the territory of Chechnya, took place on 9th February, during an air raid on Chechen bases in the mountains near the Georgian border. All of the vacuum bombs were dropped by Su-24 bombers. Unconfirmed media reports Information on the use of certain types of new weapons in Dagestan and Chechnya is not always verified. Details of MiG-29SMT sorties in Chechnya were later confirmed as erroneous. (Quite simply, the dispute between the leaders of RSK MiG and Russian Avionics led to the removal of the latter company"s equipment from the two operable prototypes before the hostilities in Dagestan began). Although three Ka-50 helicopters did arrive at the combat arena on 25th November, there has been no information on their actual combat use. Reports on the use of modified versions of the Mi-8 helicopter and Su-30 fighter were later confirmed with a rider that the RusAF and Army Aviation do not have these aircraft in their inventories. The examples flown over Chechnya were experimental prototypes. These types were most likely flown in the combat area to confirm their declared tactical capabilities. Pilots and tactics According to Lieutenant General Valery Gorbenko, Commander of the North Caucasus aviation group, the Su-24 frontal bombers are normally not authorized to attack targets with unguided weapons that are less than 3 km away from a dwelling. Inside the 3 km zone, the targets are destroyed by low-flying Su-25 attack aircraft. Gorbenko said that the biggest problems now are a shortage of highly experienced personnel serving, preparing weapons for combat use and a heavy load on the logistics system. He added that the aviation has enough munitions and fuel, but the problem is getting these to the airfields. On average, the combat skills of pilots are low, due to the low numbers of flight hours accumulated over the past few years. Reportedly, ordinary Su-24 and Su-25 pilots had 18-26 flight hours annually in 1997-1999, while the minimum required for maintaining handling skills is 80 hours. However, strikes with guided weapons have been generally successful, mainly because such missions are flown by the most experienced pilots available, including test pilots from RusAF weapons evaluation centres. The RusAF and Army Aviation still have a considerable number of officers with large combat experience gained in Afghanistan and North Caucasus. Chechen rebels have a weak anti-aircraft defence, so the real threat to an Su-25 is relatively low. In most instances, Su-25s are fired at by manually-aimed 12.7-mm DShK machine guns and, occasionally, that of ZU-23-2 23 mm guns. To reduce the risk of being hit, Su-25 pilots try to reduce the time over the target by making "hit-and-run" attacks. The RusAF uses two methods of replacing pilots fighting in Chechnya with “fresh" colleagues. Normally, an air regiment is asked to form a group of pilots for a tour in Chechnya and then the group arrives at a given air base on North Caucasus on their own aircraft. After the tour is finished, they are relieved by a similar group from other regiment. Before “fresh" pilots are ordered to fly a low-altitude attack mission, they fly relatively simple high-altitude bombing raids. Another method involves a team of pilots arriving at an air base for a tour and flying the aircraft of the local regiment. This applies only to highly experienced pilots. Valery Gorbenko asserts that these methods have maintained the share of successfully flown strike missions at 95%. In the case of Su-25 attacks, the RusAF often uses twin seat Su-25UB combat trainers along with single seat aircraft. The “twin" is used as a command post and also for evaluation of damage caused to the targets. Chechens fight back The top weapons in Chechen anti-aircraft defences are shoulder-launched Strela, Igla and Stinger missiles. According to Defense Minister, Igor Sergeyev, when the war began, the Chechens had 100 Strela and Igla missiles plus 70 Stingers. So far, launches of these missiles have been rare. There are reports that the Chechens try to use a missile only when a successful launch is guaranteed, as in the case when a Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on 4th October. Reportedly, the Stinger missile was fired when the aircraft was in the most vulnerable position, during a low-height turn over the area (the Su-24MR was looking for a pilot of an Su-25 downed a day earlier). So far, this Su-24 remains the only victim of surface-to-air missiles in this war. To reduce the threat from heat-homing missiles, the Russian aircraft make extensive use of flares, such as the non-stop firing of flares during a low-level pass to the allocated target. By November, the RusAF had lost two Su-25s (near Buinaksk on 9th September, and near Tolstoi Yurt on 3rd October) and one Su-24MR (4th October). The aircraft lost near Buinaksk was abandoned by the pilot after the it ran out of fuel, as a result of leaks in the tanks caused by combat damage. Since 4th October, the rebels have been able to down one more Su-25. Combat losses of Army Aviation for the whole period of hostilities have been three Mi-8 helicopters. Intensity of strikes From the RusAF, units of the Fourth Air Army, enforced with two regiments of Moscow military district and special groups from RusAF weapons evaluation centers, formed the air force"s presence in the hostilities. According to official data, in the period between 8th August and 25th September, the RusAF performed over 1,700 missions, including 1,300 by Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft. By early November, the figure had risen to 3,000. Peaks of aerial strike intensity were spotted in late September - early October, when the federal forces began the invasion of Chechnya, and then in late October - early November. At that time a daily rate equated to 100 to 200 sorties. Due to bad weather in November, the combat aircraft flew rarely, and on some days were no flights at all. The next peak was in January, again up to 200 sorties a day. By 20 January, the RusAF alone (excluding Army Aviation) had made 6,000 sorties. What comes next? Despite the heavy artillery fire and intensive support from the air, since 8th August the losses of the federal have amounted to 1,200 servicemen killed and 3,500 wounded. Chechen losses are estimated at 10,000. The Russian troops in Chechnya are 50,000 strong, including 5,000 VDV paratroopers. As of early February, the MoD"s estimate of remaining Chechen forces is 7,000-10,000 warriors. The Russian troops have occupied all major cities and towns, while the rebels continue to control mountain areas. Over 90% of all military and industrial targets have been destroyed, according to RusAF Commander, Anatoly Kornukov. The separatists, however, are not going to surrender. It will be very hard to fight them in the mountains, where the federal forces cannot use armored vehicles and heavy guns. Unless peace is politically brokered, Russian military pilots will face a huge task in tackling the mountain areas along the border between Chechnya and Georgia.

Article ID: 1423